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This paper considers how six alternative rebate rules affect voluntary contributions in a threshold public-
good experiment. The rules differ by (1) whether an individual can receive a proportional rebate of
excess contributions, a winner-takes-all of any excess contributions, or a full rebate of one’s contribution
in the event the public good is provided and excess contributions exist, and (2) whether the probability
of receiving a rebate is proportional to an individual’s contribution relative to total contributions or
is a simple uniform probability distribution set by the number of contributors. The paper adds to the
existing experimental economics literature on threshold public goods by investigating both aggregate
and individual demand revelation under the winner-take-all and random full-rebate rules. Half of the
rules (proportional rebate, winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group members, and
random full-rebate with uniform probability) provide total contributions that nearly equal total benefits,
while the rest (winner-take-all with proportional probability, winner-take-all with uniform probability
among contributors only, and random full-rebate with proportional probability) exceed benefits by
over 30 percent. Only the proportional rebate rule is found to achieve both aggregate and individual
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Many public goods cannot be provided in part, but only in whole after their cost of 
provision is covered.  For example, it would not make much sense to provide half a lighthouse, 
two-thirds of a bridge, or one-quarter of a trail needed for a public bike path to connect two 
towns.  The cost of providing such public goods is often called a “threshold” or “provision 
point,” which may or may not be known with certainty before soliciting contributions to fund it.
1  
If fundraising efforts meet or exceed the provision point, then the public good is provided; 
otherwise, it is not and all contributions are refunded.
2 
In the threshold public-good case, what happens to the excess contributions if the total 
amount collected exceeds the provision point?  In Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation’s 
proposed green power program to finance a renewable energy facility and plant 50,000 trees in 
the state of New York (see n. 1; and Rose et al., 2002), any excess contributions would be used 
to plant additional trees or service additional homes by the renewable energy facility; i.e., excess 
contributions supply extra or extended benefits.  Swallow, Spencer, and Whinstanley (2000) 
offer another example where excess contributions beyond that needed to fund a ten-year 
conservation easement with an (a priori) unknown provision point on two parcels of forested 
wetland in the state of Rhode Island would be returned (or rebated) to contributors.  It is also 
conceivable that excess contributions could be frivolously used in a way that provides little or no 
benefit to the contributor, such as funding a pizza party for fundraiser workers.  How excess 
contributions are used can be a significant issue in the minds of would-be contributors—will the 
excess contributions be used to supply extra benefits, be returned, or be wasted?  This concern 
could affect individuals’ willingness to contribute toward funding and thus to reveal their value 
for a public good. 
  1Marks and Croson (1998), for example, investigate the differences in contributions 
between a no rebate, proportional rebate, and extended benefit provision rule.
3  Their results 
suggest that contributions are highest with extended benefits, while the no rebate and 
proportional rebate policies generate similar contributions, which are not statistically different 
from the Nash equilibrium level.  The current paper offers no more comparisons between these 
three rules, but rather concentrates on the middle ground, where excess contributions are rebated. 
Herein we concentrate on how six different rebate rules affect voluntary contributions to 
a threshold public good.  The rules differ by (1) whether an individual can receive a proportional 
rebate of excess contributions, a winner-takes-all of any excess contributions, or a share of any 
excess contributions equal to his or her contribution (i.e., a full-rebate of one’s contribution),
4 
and (2) whether the probability of receiving a rebate is proportional to an individual’s 
contribution relative to total contributions or is a simple uniform probability distribution set by 
the number of contributors.  As explained later, the rules are (1) proportional rebate, (2) winner-
take-all with proportional probability, (3) winner-take-all with uniform probability among 
contributors only, (4) winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group members, (5) 
random full-rebate with uniform probability, and (6) random full-rebate with proportional 
probability.   
Our main objectives are to (1) identify rebate rules that are empirically efficient in that 
the public good (where total benefits exceed total costs) is provided and (2) identify rebate rules 
that are empirically demand revealing on the aggregate and individual levels.  For fundraisers, 
provision of the public good is most important, but for benefit-cost and valuation practitioners, 
accurate measurement of the value of a public good is important (e.g., Brookshire and Coursey, 
1987; Poe et al., 2002; Rondeau, Poe, and Schulze, 1996; Spencer, 2007; Spencer, Swallow, and 
  2Miller, 1998).  Thus, in addition to public good provision, we seek [as in Rondeau, Schulze, and 
Poe (1999)] a public-good provision mechanism that is, at least, empirically demand revealing 
and easily understood and implemented in environments that mimic natural field conditions, 
such as the case in which contributors donate only once to a public good.
5 
We reconsider the proportional rebate rule used by Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999, 
Treatment B) and compare it to several variations of the winner-take-all and random full-rebate 
rules.  If a fundraising effort results in excess contributions, a proportional rebate rule returns to 
a contributor a share of the excess contributions in proportion to her contribution relative to the 
total contributions collected.
6 
Alternatively, we consider the winner-take-all and random full-rebate rules.  If a 
fundraising effort results in excess contributions, a winner-take-all rule returns the entire excess 
contributions to one randomly chosen individual, and a random full-rebate rule returns individual 
contributions to randomly chosen contributors until all excess contributions equal zero.  Both 
rules are relatively simple. 
It is worth mentioning, however, the redistributive consequences of each rule.  Any 
excess contributions are redistributed among all the contributors in a proportional rebate rule, to 
the sole winner of the lottery under a winner-take-all rule, and among the winners of rebates in a 
random full-rebate rule.  Although an additional unit of endowment contributed by an individual 
beyond the provision point is not wasted under any of our rebate rules because it is redistributed 
among other individuals in the group who receive a positive earning from the over contribution, 
Marks and Croson (1998) show that the individual’s earning (or payoff) from her over 
contribution is negative under the proportional rebate rule.  This is also true in general for the 
winner-take-all and random full-rebate rules; however, if the aggregate amount of excess 
  3contributions exceeds the individual’s contribution amount and if the individual is a winner of a 
rebate, then the individual’s earning from her over contribution can be positive under a winner-
take-all rule and zero under a random full-rebate rule. 
The winner-take-all rule (or lottery) is interesting for two reasons.  First, it is of practical 
importance to fundraising organizations.  Many non-profit organizations rely on lotteries (or 
charitable gambling) as a significant source of revenue to finance public goods (e.g., Morgan, 
2000).  Second, as will be shown, our winner-take-all with proportional probability rule is 
particularly interesting because it is mathematically identical, in terms of expected earnings, to 
the proportional rebate rule.  Although these rules have the same expected earnings, one might 
conjecture that individuals will contribute more for the chance to win a large prize (or rebate, as 
possible under a winner-take-all rule) than they will for the certainty of a small prize (or rebate, 
as under the proportional rebate rule).
7  It is an empirical question to answer whether the winner-
take-all and proportional rebate rules will yield similar results in terms of demand revelation. 
In the random full-rebate rule, the rebating of excess contributions can result in a full 
rebate of one’s contribution so that a contributor may benefit from provision of the public good 
at no cost to herself.  Random full-rebates are used by some non-profit organizations in their 
efforts to raise funds.  For example, the Mankato Area Hockey Association (MAHA), which is a 
non-profit organization devoted to the education and competitive play of youth hockey in 
southern Minnesota, uses the random full-rebate principle in their “calendar raffle” fundraiser.  
All members of MAHA are required to sell team calendars to raise funds for the association, 
which helps cover MAHA’s operating expenses.  The calendars are sold for $20 each, and each 
purchaser of a calendar has their name entered in a raffle to win their $20 back.  This example 
represents our main interest in the rule. 
  4Overall, the current paper adds to the existing literature on threshold public goods in 
several respects.  First, it investigates the use of winner-take-all and random full-rebate rules in 
the provision of a threshold public good.  The proportional rebate rule has been investigated by 
others (e.g., Marks and Croson, 1998; Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe, 1999), but the random full-
rebate rule, to our knowledge, has not been previously investigated.  The literature has examined 
the use of lotteries with fixed prizes in the provision of a continuous public good, but not the use 
of a winner-take-all lottery of excess contributions in the provision of a threshold public good (in 
the lab see Morgan and Sefton, 2000; Lange, List, and Price, 2007; and in a field experiment see 
Landry et al., 2006).  Second, the current paper econometrically models individual contributions 
as an explicit function of individual induced values and rebate rule.  Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe 
(1999) discuss the relationship between individual contributions and values, but they primarily 
focus on the performance of the proportional rebate rule to achieve aggregate demand 
revelation.
8  Rondeau, Poe, and Schulze (2005) conduct a meta-analysis that econometrically 
models mean and median contribution levels from various experimental sessions as a function of 
individual induced values and other treatment parameters.  They show that contribution levels 
are generally more responsive to changes in induced values under a proportional rebate rule than 
under a simple voluntary contribution mechanism.  Thus, although other researchers have 
considered the relationship between contributions and values, the current paper offers a 
perspective on this relationship across new rebate rules. 
Finally, our study more generally advances our understanding of the economics of 
charity.  As List (2008) details, the demand side of the economics of charity is only beginning to 
be studied and our work pinpoints potential mechanisms that can be employed in the field to 
  5enhance fundraising success.  In this sense, our work not only speaks to theorists and empiricists, 
but also holds importance for practitioners. 
All treatments in our experiment were run in a one-shot laboratory setting with 
heterogeneous induced values.  The experimental results suggest that all of the rebate rules are 
empirically efficient in that the public good is provided under each rule, but all rebate rules do 
not achieve aggregate demand revelation.  Half of the rules (proportional rebate, winner-take-all 
with uniform probability among all group members, and random full-rebate with uniform 
probability) provide total contributions that nearly equal total benefits, while the rest (winner-
take-all with proportional probability, winner-take-all with uniform probability among 
contributors only, and random full-rebate with proportional probability) exceed benefits by over 
30 percent.  Our proportional rebate, winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group 
members, and random full-rebate with uniform probability treatments yield comparable results to 
Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe’s (1999) proportional rebate treatment in terms of aggregate demand 
revelation.  Although these rules achieve aggregate demand revelation, our model of individual 
behavior suggests that only the proportional rebate rule achieves individual demand revelation.  
This suggests the proportional rebate rule may be an empirically viable demand-revealing 
mechanism on the individual level in the threshold public-good case. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 details the rebate rules 
used in the experiment.  Section 3 presents the experimental design and procedures.  Section 4 
defines the hypotheses tested in this paper.  Section 5 discusses the results, and section 6 offers 
some concluding remarks, which include implications for fundraisers and valuation practitioners. 
 
 
  62.  Rebate Rules and Individual Earnings 
  Consider a group of N individuals each endowed with an initial sum of money equal to I.  
Each individual decides how much of I to keep for themselves and how much to contribute to the 
provision of a public good which costs PP.  If the sum of individual contributions (∑Cj) equals 
or exceeds the cost of providing the public good, then the public good is provided and each 
individual receives a payoff value equal to Vi.  Here, individuals have the same endowment I but 
their valuation Vi for the public good is different (i.e., heterogeneous).  If the sum of individual 
contributions falls short of PP, then each individual receives their contribution (Ci) back; i.e., 
there is a money-back guarantee (MBG) in the event the public good is not provided.  The MBG 
has been used to reduce free-rider behavior in previous public good experiments (see Isaac, 
Schmidtz, and Walker, 1989). 
  The group does not pay more than the cost of providing the good.  Any excess 
contributions beyond PP are returned or rebated to the group.  We compare the winner-take-all 
and random full-rebate rules to the proportional rebate rule first discussed by Smith (1980) and 
later used by Brookshire and Coursey (1987), Marks and Croson (1998), and Rondeau, Schulze, 
and Poe (1999).  As mentioned earlier, we consider the winner-take-all and random full-rebate 
rules under both a proportional and a uniform probability element.  A person’s proportional 
probability of receiving a rebate depends on the magnitude of her contribution relative to the 
total contributions collected, while a person’s uniform probability of receiving a rebate depends 
on whether she contributes and the total number of contributors (ND).  A proportional probability 
structure resembles the proportional rebate rule, while a uniform probability structure determines 
the odds of winning many lotteries and raffles. 
The individual earning functions (πi) and details of each rebate rule are discussed below. 
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With a proportional rebate, if ∑Cj > PP, individual i's earnings equal her private consumption of 
I, net of her contribution Ci, plus her value for the public good (Vi) and a share of the excess 
contributions in proportion to the magnitude of her contribution relative to the total contributions 
collected. 
Winner-Take-All Rules 
  For the winner-take-all rules, individual i's earning function is the same, but the 
probability of receiving a rebate differs across the rules.  The common form of the individual 
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In the winner-take-all rules, any excess contributions are returned as one payment to a single 
individual. 
  In the winner-take-all with proportional probability rule, individual i's expected earnings 
are the same as in the proportional rebate rule, given the same excess (∑Cj − PP), personal (Ci), 
and set of contributions.  The mechanics of the two rules, however, are quite different.  With a 
  8proportional rebate rule, all contributors receive a partial rebate if ∑Cj > PP, each with 
probability one.  In contrast, under a winner-take-all with proportional probability rule, only one 
contributor is randomly selected to receive a rebate, which equals all the excess contributions.  It 
is possible Ci < (∑Cj − PP), so individual i receives more than she contributed if she wins the 
lottery over the excess contributions.  In the winner-take-all with proportional probability rule, 
individual i's chances of winning the lottery are directly proportional to the size of her 
contribution relative to the total contributions collected, Ci/∑Cj.  Note, if ∑Cj and Ci are identical 
under the winner-take-all with proportional probability rule and the proportional rebate rule, 
individual i's expected rebate under the winner-take-all with proportional probability rule equals 
her actual rebate under the proportional rebate rule.  Of course, it is an empirical question to find 
whether the winner-take-all with proportional probability rule generates contributions equal to 
those under the proportional rebate rule. 
  The next rule is the winner-take-all with uniform probability among contributors only 
rule.  If ∑Cj > PP, individual i's chances of winning the excess contributions depend on whether 
she contributed and the total number of contributors.  If Ci > $0, individual i's chances of 
winning the excess contributions equals the ratio of 1 to ND, where ND equals the number of 
people who contributed (or donated) to the provision of the public good. 
We also consider a winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group members 
rule.  This rule is similar to the winner-take-all with uniform probability among contributors 
only rule, except the winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group members rule 
gives all group members a chance to win all of the excess contributions if ∑Cj > PP.  Regardless 
of whether individual i does or does not contribute to the provision of the public good, individual 
i's chances of winning the excess contributions is equal to the ratio of 1 to N, where N equals the 
  9total number of group members.  This rule allows one to investigate whether a “no contribution 
necessary” element depresses contributions under the winner-take-all rule.  To explain, since a 
winner-take-all rule may conceptually lead to some type of “embedding effect,” where a 
subject’s contribution reflects not only her individual value for the public good but also her value 
for having the chance to “win it all” (cf., Clotfelter and Cook, 1989), we consider the1/N 
probability rule in an attempt to capture an individual’s value for the public good under the 
winner-take-all rule without any confounding embedding effect. 
Random Full-Rebate Rules 
  For the random full-rebate rules, πi is 
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where Ri equals individual i's rebate which is less than or equal to i's contribution.  Note that 0 ≤ 
Ri ≤ Ci.  If the remaining excess contributions are greater than or equal to i's contribution [i.e., 
(∑Cj − PP) ≥ Ci], then i has a chance to win back her contribution, where Ri = Ci.  If the excess 
contributions are less than i's contribution, then i only has a chance to win the remaining excess 
contributions where Ri < Ci.  Contributors are randomly drawn until the excess contributions 
equal zero, at which point all other contributors receive a rebate of Ri = 0. 
We consider two probability structures—uniform and proportional—to determine the 
winners of rebates.  Under the random full-rebate with uniform probability rule, contributor i's 
chance of receiving a rebate is 1/ND, where ND equals the number of people who contributed to 
the provision of the public good.  Under the random full-rebate with proportional probability 
  10rule, contributor i's chance of receiving a rebate is determined by the proportion of i's 
contribution relative to the total contributions collected. 
3.  Experimental Design and Procedures 
  The experiment was run at the University of Central Florida.  The sample consisted of 
270 student-subjects from two, junior level, economics courses, titled “Quantitative Tools I” and 
“Quantitative Tools II.”  The experiment took place during regular class hours, and none of the 
students were forced or pressured to participate in the experiment.  Subjects were aware that the 
experiment was not a class assignment, but that it would involve them in making economic 
decisions, which could earn them real money.  The experiment was a one-shot game in that each 
subject only made one decision.
9  Subjects were informed that not everyone would be given the 
same set of experimental instructions, so subjects were asked to remain quiet and read their 
instructions silently to themselves.   
  Although subjects knew that not everyone in the classroom was participating in the same 
group (i.e., not given the same set of instructions), they all knew how many people were in their 
specific group.  To maintain anonymity among group members, no communication between 
subjects was allowed at any point during the experiment.  Each rebate rule was tested with a 
group size of N = 45 subjects.
10  Moreover, all subjects were endowed with I = $6. 
  All language and experimental parameters used in this experiment adhered to that used in 
Treatment B of Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999), where the subjects were told the group size 
but not the provision point, nor the distributions of the provision point and induced values.  In 
fact, the current experiment’s proportional rebate treatment used the same experimental 
instructions as in Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999; Treatment B).  It is plausible, at least in the 
United States (U.S.), that would-be contributors in the field would be familiar with their group 
  11size, since many “city limit” signs throughout the U.S. state the population size of the city.  
However, for reasons discussed below, many would-be contributors in the field may not 
necessarily be expected to know the PP or the distributions of the PP and individual values.   
Following Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999), the experimental instructions stated that 
the provision point (PP, called “investment cost” in the experimental instructions) was 
“predetermined but unknown to you.”  An unknown provision point was used (1) to provide a 
better test of individual demand revelation under realistic conditions that mimic field scenarios 
where the final cost of provision is subject to competitive bid (see n. 1), and (2) to prevent 
subjects from focusing on a simple strategy of equal cost sharing, whereby subjects contribute an 
amount equal to the provision point (PP) divided by the group size (N).  Equal cost sharing is an 
interesting strategy, which leads to public good provision.  However, given heterogeneous 
induced values, application of such a strategy would compromise a test of individual demand 
revelation.  As argued in Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999, p. 465), uncertainty about the cost of 
a public good or the sample size “…may encourage demand revelation by forcing individuals to 
formulate a contribution strategy more strongly based on their private incentives rather than on 
the availability of a simple rule of thumb,” and Bohara et al. (1998, p. 145) have noted that 
complete information on the PP and N “…may be used by players to focus on stating the average 
per person cost of the good.” 
Individual induced valuations (Vi) for the public good ranged, in $0.75 increments, from 
$1.50 to $4.50.  Since individual values for a public good usually are private information in real 
life, individuals in our experiment knew their own valuations but the range (or distribution) of 
others’ induced values was not made common knowledge.  Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999, p. 
461) note “This feature mimics field conditions where individuals value public goods differently 
  12but are generally unaware of other peoples’ values (Alston and Nowell, 1996),” and Bohara et al. 
(1998, p. 145) state “…individuals will presumably know their own valuations but not likely 
those of others.”  Within each group (i.e., treatment), nine subjects were assigned to each 
valuation, so that the mean and median induced value was $3 for each group.  Each subject was 
allowed to contribute any amount they wanted within a range of $0 to $6—that is, contributions 
could not exceed the endowment of I = $6. 
  Each set of experimental instructions contained an “information and decision sheet,” 
which listed the subject’s endowment, valuation, group size, and stated that the investment cost 
was predetermined but unknown to them.  The sheet also asked for personal information 
regarding their gender, age, academic major, and family income, and it required the subject to 
state their official contribution to the public good.  If an individual did not wish to make a 
contribution, the individual wrote the number “0” in the space next to the statement “my bid is:  
$ _____.”   
The investment cost (PP) for each group was randomly chosen, via a computer, from a 
normal distribution with mean $45 and variance $9.  In an attempt (1) to provide a realistic 
situation where would-be contributors in the field may not necessarily know the true probability 
distribution of the PP (e.g., because of unforeseen delay and transaction costs in construction, 
land acquisitions, legal fees, negotiations, etc.), and (2) to replicate the experimental results 
under Treatment B of Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999), which fits the unknown distribution 
scenario, our procedure for randomly determining the PP was not described to the subjects.  The 
procedure resulted in a PP of $47.10, $46.23, $47.98, $41.23, $43.45, and $45.12 for the 
proportional rebate, winner-take-all with proportional probability, winner-take-all with uniform 
probability among contributors only, winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group 
  13members, random full-rebate with uniform probability, and random full-rebate with proportional 
probability rules, respectively. 
After each subject filled-out their information and decision sheet, the experimental 
monitors collected the sheets.  Total contributions were tallied for each group and subject 
earnings were distributed during the following class meeting.  As in Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe 
(1999), social security numbers identified subjects for disbursement purposes.  In the rules that 
used uniform probability (i.e., winner-take-all with uniform probability among contributors only, 
winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group members, and random full-rebate with 
uniform probability), we randomly drew identification numbers from a fishbowl to determine 
winners of rebates.  In the rules that used proportional probability (i.e., winner-take-all with 
proportional probability and random full-rebate with proportional probability), we used a 
computer to randomly determine winners of rebates based on their contributions relative to the 
total contributions collected. 
As a final note, one might question several features of our experimental design, namely 
(1) an unknown PP drawn from an unknown (to the subjects) probability distribution and (2) 
incomplete information regarding the distribution of induced values for the public good.  These 
design features admittedly hinder one’s ability to make game-theoretic predictions.  In particular, 
our experimental design is a game of incomplete information, which means that any equilibrium 
must be Bayesian Nash, but without knowing the subjective distributions of the subjects, which 
we did not determine, one cannot characterize them.  This is a limitation of the experimental 
design, but we have made this sacrifice in favor of realism.   
Suleiman (1997, pp. 165-166) notes “Common to the theoretical and empirical research 
of step-level goods is the assumption that all parameters of the situation are common knowledge.  
  14In fact, such an assumption fails to capture many naturalistic situations involving uncertainty 
about various parameters of the situation.”
11  Our experimental design attempts to mimic a field 
situation where many would-be donors would not necessarily be expected to know the 
distribution of individual values for the public good, the PP, or the probability distribution of the 
PP.  For example, consider a non-profit organization or community group trying to raise funds to 
establish a greenway complete with a hiking/biking trail, where the total cost of provision (PP) is 
subject to competitive bid among contractors and to unanticipated delay and transaction costs in 
land purchases, negotiations, legal fees, and construction costs, which can create uncertainty in 
the PP and its probability distribution.
12  It would also be very difficult for would-be donors to 
know the true distribution of values that all citizens place on the proposed greenway.  Although 
we are not the first to run experimental treatments with uncertainty in these parameters (e.g., see 
Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe, 1999; Bohara et al., 1998), our diversity of rebate rules run with 
such uncertainty offers a contribution to the growing literature on the study of uncertainty in 
threshold public good cases—see McBride (2006) for an excellent extension and review of the 
literature on uncertainty in threshold public goods. 
4.  Hypotheses 
In conjunction with the first objective of this paper—identify rebate rules that are 
empirically efficient—our first hypothesis is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1:  All the rebate rules yield empirically efficient results in that the public  
good (where total benefits exceed total costs) is provided. 
  As mentioned earlier, our experimental design represents a game of incomplete 
information, where any equilibrium must be Bayesian Nash.  This means that the equilibrium 
actions of any group depend on each group member’s subjective beliefs about the distributions 
  15of the PP and individual values and others’ beliefs about these distributions.  However, since 
such beliefs were not determined during the experiment, one cannot make equilibrium 
predictions.
13  This is true for the experiment and the field scenario for which the design is 
meant to mimic.  These features are limitations of the experimental design, but they do not 
necessarily preclude the subjects from providing the public good, and they might be viewed as 
providing a more stringent test of the rebate rules in terms of demand revelation. 
In conjunction with the second objective of this paper—identify rebate rules that are 
empirically demand revealing on the aggregate and individual levels—our second hypothesis is 
composed of two parts as follows: 
Hypothesis 2A:  All the rebate rules empirically achieve aggregate demand revelation. 
Hypothesis 2B:  All the rebate rules empirically achieve individual demand revelation. 
Rejection of Hypothesis 2A would suggest that at least one of the rebate rules does not 
achieve aggregate demand revelation.  Based on Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe’s (1999) 
experimental work, we expect the proportional rebate rule to achieve aggregate demand 
revelation.  However, whether our winner-take-all and random full-rebate rules achieve 
comparable results to the proportional rebate rule is an empirical question.  One might conjecture 
that the prospect of winning one’s money back, plus others’ money, as in a winner-take-all rule, 
will yield higher mean contribution-to-induced-value (Ci/Vi) ratios than the proportional rebate 
rule,
 14 while the random full-rebate rule might be expected to yield closer results to the 
proportional rebate rule.  We empirically test these conjectures. 
Later we test Hypothesis 2B in a model of individual behavior.  Hypothesis 2B offers a 
stricter test of demand revelation than does Hypothesis 2A. 
  16Another factor that we consider is the potential effect of a “no contribution necessary” 
element in the winner-take-all rule, which (as discussed earlier) is implemented to help 
counteract any potential embedding effect in having the chance to “win it all.”  Unlike the 
winner-take-all with proportional probability and winner-take-all with uniform probability 
among contributors only rules, the winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group 
members rule gives all group members the chance to win the rebate lottery if excess 
contributions exist.  It is plausible to assume a “no contribution necessary” rule might depress 
contributions and the mean Ci/Vi ratio compared to a “contribution necessary” rule for eligibility 
to win all the excess contributions, which leads us to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3:  The winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group members  
 rule yields a lower mean Ci/Vi ratio than the winner-take-all with  
 proportional probability and winner-take-all with uniform probability  
 among contributors only rules. 
5.  Results and Discussion 
  Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of several indicators of mechanism 
performance by rebate rule.  We investigate the mean and median individual contribution (Ci), 
the mean and median ratio (in percent) of individual contribution to induced value, Ci/Vi (i.e., the 
proportion of individual induced value contributed toward the provision of the public good), and 
the ratio (in percent) of aggregate demand revealed to aggregate demand induced, ∑Cj/∑Vi (i.e., 
the percentage of aggregate demand revealed). 
Result 1:  We find empirical support for Hypothesis 1.  All rebate rules appear empirically 
efficient in that the public good (where total benefits exceed total costs) is provided under each 
rule.
15 
  17Total contributions exceed the provision point under each rule.  All subjects receive their 
induced value from provision of the public good, plus any rebate coming to them. 
These efficiency results hold under any of the provision point draws realized.  As 
discussed earlier, the provision points ranged from a low of $41.23 in the winner-take-all with 
uniform probability among all group members rule to a high of $47.98 in the winner-take-all 
with uniform probability among contributors only rule.  Total contributions ranged from a low of 
$121 in the winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group members rule to a high of 
$188.17 in the winner-take-all with proportional probability rule—see Table 1 for a comparison 
of total contributions across rules.  Given a range of provision point values from $41.23 to 
$47.98 and a range of total contributions from $121 to $188.17, each rule would have led to 
public good provision (i.e., aggregate efficiency) had any of the other rule’s provision point 
draws been realized instead. 
Result 2:  We find no empirical support for Hypothesis 2A.  Half the rebate rules (i.e., 
proportional rebate, winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group members, and 
random full-rebate with uniform probability) achieve aggregate demand revelation, while the 
rest (i.e., winner-take-all with proportional probability, winner-take-all with uniform probability 
among contributors only, and random full-rebate with proportional probability) lead to demand 
over-revelation. 
The proportional rebate, winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group 
members, and random full-rebate with uniform probability rules are comparable in terms of 
aggregate demand revelation.  These rules provide total contributions that nearly equal total 
benefits (or values).  The percentage of demand revealed by the proportional rebate, winner-
take-all with uniform probability among all group members, and random full-rebate with 
  18uniform probability rules are 99%, 108%, and 90%, which are comparable to the 95% aggregate 
demand revelation reported in Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999; Treatment B).  The mean 
contribution for these rules is not statistically different from the mean induced value of $3, and 
the mean ratio (in percent) of individual contribution to induced value (Ci/Vi) is not statistically 
different from 100% for these rules.  An analysis of median contributions and ratios also reveals 
no statistical difference from $3 and 100% for these rules—in fact, the median ratio of individual 
contributions to induced values is 100% for these rules.   
These results are comparable to those reported in Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999; 
Treatment B), in which the mean contribution, median contribution, mean of Ci/Vi, and median 
of Ci/Vi are $2.86, $3, 103%, and 93%.  The winner-take-all with uniform probability among all 
group members rule and the random full-rebate with uniform probability rule represent 
comparable alternatives to the proportional rebate rule as aggregate demand revealing 
mechanisms.  Pairwise means t-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum Z-tests indicate no differences in 
mean and median Ci/Vi ratios among these rules (for proportional rebate versus winner-take-all 
with uniform probability among all group members t = 0.1970 and Z = 0.7444 with both p > 
0.45; for proportional rebate versus random full-rebate with uniform probability t = −0.9292 and 
Z = −0.4770 with both p > 0.35). 
  The winner-take-all rules with proportional probability and uniform probability among 
contributors only and the random full-rebate with proportional probability rule result in 
aggregate demand over-revelation.  These rules provide total contributions that exceed total 
benefits by over 30%.  For these rules, the mean and median contributions range from $3.96 to 
$4.50, and they are statistically different from the mean (and median) induced value of $3.  
  19Similarly, the mean and median Ci/Vi ratios range from 125% to 157%, and these ratios are 
statistically different from 100%. 
Although the proportional rebate and winner-take-all with proportional probability rules 
have the same expected earning structure, a (one-tailed) pairwise means t-test and Wilcoxon 
rank-sum Z-test indicate that the proportional rebate rule yields lower mean and median Ci/Vi 
ratios than the winner-take-all rule [t = −2.9929 and Z = −2.6697 (both p < 0.004)].  This 
suggests that having the potential to win more than one contributes in the winner-take-all rule 
positively affects contributions, but it may entice individuals to over-contribute (i.e., Ci > Vi). 
Overall, the above results suggest that contributions (and Ci/Vi ratios) are (1) an 
increasing function of potential earnings (or the size of potential rebate) and (2) positively 
affected by proportional, compared to uniform, probability rules.  Winner-take-all rules, which 
can generate higher potential earnings than the other rules, tend to yield higher contributions 
than the other rules.  This appears consistent with Morgan and Sefton (2000), who show that 
contributions are an increasing function of prize amount, and it suggests that our experimental 
subjects may prefer higher skewness of earnings to risk (cf., Golec and Tamarkin, 1998).  
Moreover, although higher contributions under any rebate rule increase the likelihood of 
exceeding the PP, and thus the likelihood of receiving a rebate, a higher contribution may, 
ceteris paribus, lead to a higher chance of winning a rebate under proportional probability than 
under uniform probability, which may entice individuals to contribute more under a proportional 
probability rule.  We find that the winner-take-all and random full-rebate rules yield higher 
contributions under a proportional probability rule than under a uniform probability rule (see 
Table 1).  Given these arguments, it is not surprising Table 1 shows that total contributions are 
highest under the winner-take-all with proportional probability rule. 
  20Result 3:  We find empirical support for Hypothesis 3.  A “no contribution necessary” element 
leads to lower contribution-to-induce-value (Ci/Vi) ratios in the winner-take-all rule. 
  The attraction of having a chance to win all the excess contributions if one makes a 
positive contribution to the public good is reduced by a “no contribution necessary” element.  A 
winner-take-all rule with uniform probability among all group members yields lower Ci/Vi ratios 
than a winner-take-all rule with proportional probability (t = −2.7874 and Z = −3.1824 with both 
p < 0.004) and a winner-take-all rule with uniform probability among contributors only (t = 
−2.0180 and Z = −2.4656 with both p < 0.03).  These results suggest that if one can win the 
rebate lottery over excess contributions without making a contribution, then there is little 
incentive to contribute above one’s value. 
Model of Individual Behavior 
  In Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999), aggregate demand revelation occurs not because 
everyone contributes an amount equal to their induced value, but because “…overbidding by 
some subjects essentially offsets the cheap-riding of others in all treatments” (p. 468).  If people 
simply flip a fair coin to decide between contributing $0 and their entire $6 endowment, the 
expected mean contribution would equal the mean induced value of $3.  Although this is an 
extreme case, and Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999, Treatment B) find 13% (6 out of 45) and 
11% (5 out of 45), respectively, of subjects contribute $0 and $6, it remains an open question as 
to whether demand revelation occurs at the individual level as well as the aggregate level. 
  To help address this question, we model individual contributions as a function of rebate 
rule and induced value:  Ci = f (Rulek, Rulek * Vi), where Rulek is a dummy variable representing 
the type (k) of rebate rule under which individual i participated and Rulek * Vi represent 
interaction terms between the rebate rule and induced value Vi.  We consider a linear model of 
  21varying intercepts and slopes.
 16  If a rebate rule were empirically demand revealing, one would 
expect a one-to-one relationship between contributions and induced values, which (in terms of 
our linear model) implies an intercept of zero with a slope of one for each rebate rule. 
  Given individual contributions to the public good have a lower limit of $0 and an upper 
limit of $6, we estimate the behavioral model with a two-limit Tobit model.  Table 2 presents the 
estimation results, which were estimated in LIMDEP
™.  The χ
2-statistic for a likelihood ratio test 
of model significance is highly significant with p ≈ 0.0001.  All rebate rules, except the 
proportional rebate rule, have intercepts that are statistically greater than zero.  And only the 
proportional rebate and winner-take-all with uniform probability among contributors only rules 
have slopes (0.77 and 0.84, respectively) that are statistically different from zero but not 
statistically different from 1 (both two-tailed p > 0.50). 
  These results lead to a rejection of Hypothesis 2B.  The proportional rebate rule is the 
only rule that appears to achieve individual demand revelation by having an intercept and a slope 
not statistically different from 0 and 1, respectively.  Despite the aggregate demand revelation 
results for the winner-take-all with uniform probability among all group members and the 
random full-rebate with uniform probability rules (see Table 1), contribution amounts under 
these rules are not sensitive to induced values.  Also, contribution amounts are not sensitive to 
induced values under the random full-rebate with proportional probability rule.  The winner-
take-all with proportional probability rule has a positive slope of 0.50 that is not statistically 
different from one, but it is also not statistically different from zero, which suggests contribution 
amounts under this rule are not too sensitive to induced values. 
 
    
  22  6.  Concluding Remarks 
            This paper explored the empirical performance of six rebate rules in the provision of a 
threshold public good.  Our objectives were to (1) identify rebate rules that are empirically 
efficient in that the public good (where total benefits exceed total costs) is provided and (2) 
identify rebate rules that are empirically demand revealing on the aggregate and individual 
levels.  All of our rebate rules led to public-good provision, but not all the rules achieved 
demand revelation.  The proportional rebate, winner-take-all with uniform probability among all 
group members, and random full-rebate with uniform probability rules achieved aggregate 
demand revelation, but only the proportional rebate rule also achieved individual demand 
revelation.  Thus, we found even stronger support than Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999) for the 
empirical usefulness of the proportional rebate rule in providing and valuing threshold public 
goods under one-shot conditions. 
   
 
            The winner-take-all rules with proportional probability and uniform probability among 
contributors only and the random full-rebate rule with proportional probability lead to demand 
over-revelation.  Demand over-revelation, especially under the winner-take-all with proportional 
probability and the winner-take-all with uniform probability among contributors only rules, 
suggests the presence of an embedding effect, where individuals appear to be valuing both the 
public good and the chance to “win it all.”  Such results are problematic for those who seek to 
place a value on public goods, but they can be advantageous for fundraisers.  If a fundraiser 
wants to increase total contributions, without intending to estimate the value of the good, then 
implementing one of these winner-take-all rules or the random full-rebate rule with proportional 
probability would be choices to consider.  Demand over-revelation also suggests that fundraisers 
  
  23could provide a public good where the costs exceed the benefits.  Providing a public good for 
 
which the costs exceed the benefits could be beneficial for some people but not for others.  We 
leave such redistributional issues for future research and discussion.     
            The power of the winner-take-all element to stimulate demand over-revelation, however,
appeared to be eliminated by a “no contribution necessary” element.  The winner-take-all rule 
with uniform probability among all group members yielded results that were empirically demand 
revealing in the aggregate, and were not statistically different from the proportional rebate or 
random full-rebate with uniform probability rules.     
            Overall, our experimental results have implications for both fundraisers and valuation 
practitioners.  From a fundraising perspective our results could be beneficial in devising 
alternative fundraising strategies.  For example, where state laws governing lotteries and 
gambling may preclude the use of a winner-take-all rule in some field applications, some form of 
a random full-rebate or proportional rebate rule may be a better choice.  For valuation 
practitioners seeking a one-shot demand-revealing rule on the individual level, our Tobit model 
results are encouraging for the proportional rebate rule.
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Note:  the sample size (N = 45), individual endowment (Ii = $6), and mean induced value (V = $3) are the same across rebate rules. 
 
a For comparison, the sum of induced values (∑Vi) equaled $135 for each rebate rule. 
* Different from $3 at the 5% significance level (t-test). 
** Different from $3 at the 5% significance level (sign and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests). 
† Different from 100% at the 5% significance level (t-test). 
‡ Different from 100% at the 5% significance level (sign and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests).







(Parameter = 0) 
p-value
c 
(Slope = 1) 
 
Proportional Rebate Rule: 
 
  
Proportional Rebate   0.6830 
   (1.1415) 
a 
0.5496  




Winner-Take-All (WTA) Rules: 
 
    
WTA-Proportional  3.1965 
(1.1434) 
0.0052  
WTA-Proportional * VALUE  0.5008 
(0.3632) 
0.1679 0.1693 
WTA-Uniform-Contributors  1.9716 
(1.1482) 
0.0860  
WTA-Uniform-Contributors * VALUE  0.8395 
(0.3659) 
0.0218 0.6609 
WTA-Uniform-All-Members  2.6554 
 (1.1427) 
0.0201  




Random Full-Rebate (RFR) Rules: 
 
    
RFR-Uniform
  3.5842 
(1.1279) 
0.0015  
RFR-Uniform * VALUE             −0.0735 
(0.3542) 
0.8357 0.0024 
RFR-Proportional  4.8522 
(1.1705) 
     < 0.0001   
RFR-Proportional * VALUE             −0.1519 
(0.3650) 
0.6772 0.0016 
Number of Observations           270     
σ  2.4778   
Log-likelihood         −524.0684    
χ
2-statistic             36.4184   0.0001
 d   
Degrees of Freedom             11     
 
a Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. 
b The p-values for a two-tailed test of parameter estimate different from zero. 
 
c The p-values for a two-tailed test of slope coefficient different from one.  
d The p-value for a likelihood ratio test of model significance.
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Footnotes 
1 Although some public goods have an a priori, known provision point, others have an unknown 
provision point.  When construction or landscaping is required, the exact cost of providing a 
public good may be subject to competitive bid among contractors.  For example, Rose et al. 
(2002) investigate the provision of a green power program, proposed by the Niagara Mohawk 
Power Corporation (NMPC) in the state of New York, which would involve the construction of a 
renewable energy facility and the planting of 50,000 trees in NMPC’s service area.  The exact 
provision point for the program was not known before soliciting monetary support for it because 
the project had to be sent out for competitive bid.  Additionally, McBride (2006, p.1182) notes 
“…there is often not full certainty about the threshold.  It might not be known how much money 
will be needed to complete the project, or coup plotters might not know if their faction will be 
large enough to successfully take power.”  As discussed later, our paper investigates voluntary 
contributions to a threshold public good that has an unknown provision point. 
 
2 Not all threshold public good cases refund contributions in the event that total contributions 
collected fall short of the provision point.  As discussed later, our experiment provides for such a 
refund policy, which is known in the literature as a “money-back guarantee.” 
 
3 Marks and Croson (1998) use the terms “no rebates” and “utilization rebate” to refer to wasted 
funds and extended benefits, respectively.   
 
4 We use the term “full-rebate” in this study to indicate rebates of contributions in the situation 
when the public good is provided and to distinguish this situation from outcomes where 
contributors receive a full refund under a money-back guarantee when the public good is not 
provided.  If total contributions collected exceed the provision point, then the public good is 
provided and all excess contributions are rebated.  As explained later, under a random full-rebate 
rule, contributors are randomly selected to win their contribution back until all the excess 
contributions are returned, at which point the lottery ends and no other contributors receive a 
rebate. 
  
5 Here, simple, one-shot mechanisms are more pragmatic than the more operationally complex 
Clarke-Groves (Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973), Groves-Ledyard (Groves and Ledyard , 1977), and 
Smith Auction (1979, 1980) demand-revealing mechanisms. 
 
6 Although the proportional rebate rule seems straightforward and easy to understand in theory, 
one can envision an implementation problem in practice.  Suppose a field experiment involves 
400 subjects whose contributions are equal and yield an excess of $40.  By the rules of an 
experiment with proportional rebates, this outcome implies processing a trivial rebate of $0.10 
per contributor.  In a policy setting, say for a public good provided by town government, citizen-
donors could view the processing of trivial rebates as a hidden cost, detracting from the gross 
value of the public good. 
 
7 For lotteries with a fixed prize (or rebate) and continuous public good, Morgan and Sefton 
(2000) show that contributions are an increasing function of prize amount.  Our public good 
scenario, however, deals with a continuous prize and threshold public good.  Thus, our   33
 
experiments are not exactly comparable to Morgan and Sefton (2000), but it seems reasonable to 
expect contributions to increase, in both cases, as the size of the prize or potential prize 
increases.  Our conjecture that the winner-take-all rule may generate higher contributions than 
the proportional rebate rule is also consistent with the notion that individuals prefer higher 
skewness of earnings to risk (Golec and Tamarkin, 1998). 
 
8 Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe (1999) define “aggregate demand revelation” as the situation where 
the ratio of total contributions to total benefits (or induced values) equals 1 (or 100%), and mean 
(median) contributions equal mean (median) benefits.  “Demand revelation” as an individual 
concept, however, is defined as a one-to-one relationship between contributions and benefits (or 
values).  A provision rule could yield aggregate demand revelation without being demand 
revealing at the individual level.  We explore both issues in this paper. 
 
9 One-shot experiments eliminate the possibility of any reputation effects and strategic behavior 
that can exist in early rounds of repeated-play experiments.  One-shot games also mimic real 
situations for fundraisers or analysts measuring public good values (cf., Rondeau, Schulze, and 
Poe, 1999). 
 
10 Group size can be an important treatment variable in public good experiments.  And compared 
to the majority of public good experiments which typically use group sizes of N ≤ 10, a group 
size of N = 45 is considered large and more realistic (Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe, 1999).  As 
noted in Ledyard (1995), arguments and experimental evidence exist both for contributions 
increasing and decreasing as group size increases.  Under the proportional rebate rule, Rondeau, 
Schulze, and Poe (1999) found that small groups of size N = 6 contributed on average only 64% 
of their induced value, while large groups of N = 50 and N = 45 contributed on average around 
100% of their induced value.  It would be interesting in a future experiment to vary the group 
size under our winner-take-all and random full-rebate rules to see if group size matters. 
 
11 Threshold public goods are also called step-level, binary, discrete, lumpy, or provision point 
goods. 
 
12 See Brewer (2003, Chapter 13) for a discussion of the obstacles and uncertainties in providing 
greenways, which are linear landscapes that connect open spaces by following either natural 
corridors (such as riverfronts or stream valleys) or developed lands (such as roadways or 
abandoned railroad lines). 
 
13 Additionally, although the existence of a money-back guarantee leads to one inefficient 
outcome, where each individual ends up with his or her initial endowment if ∑Cj < PP, there are 
many vectors of contributions that might be equilibria that support this outcome. 
 
14 In our treatment comparisons we follow the standard procedure of testing a null hypothesis of 
equality versus a research (i.e., alternative) hypothesis of strict inequality.  Given differences in 
uncertainty over receiving a rebate, a null hypothesis of equality between the proportional rebate 
and winner-take-all rules (and random full-rebate rules) requires an assumption of risk neutrality.  
We do not attempt to measure the risk preferences of our subjects, but our research hypothesis 
may remain valid regardless of risk preference if one assumes individuals prefer higher skewness   34
 
of returns to risk.  Golec and Tamarkin (1998) provide insights into why individuals sometimes 
over-bet low-probability/high-variance/high-skewness (of returns) games and under-bet high-
probability/low-variance/low-skewness games.  Golec and Tamarkin’s (1998) work, along with 
Garrett and Sobel (1999), show that individuals (at least for horse racing and state lottery games) 
prefer higher skewness of returns to risk.  That is, larger prizes entice risk-averse individuals to 
play.  Although this study does not test whether subjects prefer higher skewness of earnings to 
risk, we conjecture that the moderately low-risk nature of contributing (largely created by a 
MBG), in conjunction with a potential chance to win a sum of money greater than one’s 
contribution (as in a winner-take-all rule), might entice one to contribute more relative to a 
situation where one may have the chance to only receive part of their contribution back (as in a 
proportional rebate rule). 
 
15 An anonymous reviewer speculates that our efficiency results might be an artifact of the 
unknown provision point.  In a field experiment involving the provision of a threshold public 
good with an unknown provision point, Rose et al. (2002, p. 146) argue that information on the 
level of the provision point “…should be irrelevant, since changing the threshold level and even 
knowledge of the exact threshold level has been shown to be inconsequential in the presence of a 
money-back guarantee (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999; Rondeau, Schulze, and Poe, 1999).”  
Rondeau, Poe, and Schulze (2005) also find that the threshold level has no statistically 
significant effect on mean and median contributions in laboratory experiments.  In conjunction 
with our second objective to identify rebate rules that are empirically demand revealing, one 
might also suggest that the provision point should be irrelevant since individual valuation theory 
is based on what the good is worth to the individual, not the good’s cost.  Whether our efficiency 
results would hold under different levels of a known provision point would be interesting to 
explore in future experiments. 
 
16 The linear equation is 
  
  Ci = ∑(αk Rulek + βk Rulek * Vi) 
 
where each αk and βk pair represents the intercept and slope for rebate rule k, so the summation 
is over the six rebate rules considered in the experiment.  Estimates of αk and βk for each rebate 
rule appear in Table 2.  We also considered several demographic variables (family income, 
gender, class level, and academic major) in the model, but these variables, as a group, were not 
statistically significant (p ≈ 0.1260)—see Spencer (2002) for more details. 